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It is said that Kurt Godel reflected very much on the ideas 
of Leibniz; moreover, in Godel's opinion, the future of mathe- 
matics would rest heavily on the development and application of 
infinitesimals. However, it is well known that the foundations 
of the calculus based on the notion of infinitesimals was not 
accepted for a long time. The rejection of such "numbers" with 
absolute value smaller than every positive real number led to 
the so-called ~-~ analysis. But today, infinitesimals have been 
justified by A. Robinson's Nonstandard Analysis. Insofar as one 
of Godel's results can be shown to be essentially incorporated in 
the foundations of Nonstandard Analysis, one can ask whether and 
to what extent Godel has contributed to the justification of 
infinitesimals. Indeed, in the present formulations of Nonstan- 
dard Analysis, one cannot dispense with the axiom of choice. In 
view of Godel's relative consistency result, this is no disadvan- 
tage (as it would be without this eminent theorem). After sketch- 
ing the construction principles of Nonstandard Analysis, this note 
goes on to discuss in this context the role of ~6del's result. 
Nonstandard Analysis can be presented as an axiomatic system, 
and this axiomatic system has well-defined models. To indicate a 
fairly simple model: the starting point is the field of the reals 
together with a free ultrafi lter ~ in the power set of the nat- 
ural numbers ~ as index set, and there is an ~-relative cartesian 
structure ~ ~(~) -- with the underlying set ~ ~ -- which is a 
commutative ring with unit element and zero divisors. One can 
define an equivalence relation ~FF on ~ ~ which is a congruence 
relation with respect to the operations and relations in ~ ~(~); 
the hyperreal numbers ~* are then obtained as the underlying set 
of the quotient structure ~*(~*:=~ ~/~). This model of Leibniz' 
infinitesimals is an ordered field a1~d has the following proper- 
ties: In ~* there are copies of the reals ~*  and copies of the 
natural numbers ~,  isomorphic to the original structures, so 
they may be identified with them. ~*  is a proper subset of the 
hypernatural numbers ~*. There is a hypernatural number ~ greater 
than every number of ~*  and ~* ;  hence ~* is a non-Archimedean 
field. But to every hyperreal number r*eJR* there is a hyper- 
natural number n*£~* greater than r*, so ~'* is hyper-archimedean. 
There is no hypernatural number n*6~q*\ ~*  between the natural 
numbers. ~* \~,  has no greatest lower bound in R*. One can for- 
mulate principles of hypermathematical and hypercomplete induction 
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and a principle of smallest hypernatural number, but restricted 
to subsets of ~* definable by a first-order formula. (~,~*,~ -- 
the finite numbers in ~* -- are not definable in that way.) 
Further important subclasses are the infinitesimals ~ and ~0- 
~0 is an ideal in the commutative ring F with unit element. The 
hynerreals ~*\F are precisely the inverses of the infinitesimals. 
~*\F has no greatest lower bound in ~*. The so-called transfer 
principle generates a quite close connection between the complete- 
ly ordered field ~ of the reals and the field ~* of the hyperreals. 
All f irst-order sentences are valid in ~ if and only if they are 
valid in ~*. The transfer principle is a corollary of the impor- 
tant ultraproduct theorem of ~o~, which is proved by induction on 
the complexity of the formulas using the axiom of choice. Related 
to the transfer principle is the solution principle: it states that 
if each real solution of the finite set of equations and/or in- 
equalities F 1 is also a solution of the finite set of equations 
and/or inequalities F 2 , then each hyperreal solution of F! is also 
a solution of F 2. The solution principle is not equivalent to the 
full transfer principle, but to the transfer principle restricted 
to quantifier-free formulas. In ~* an equivalence relation ~0 is 
defined, called "infinitesimally close." Every finite number, 
especially every element of ~\~, ,  is infinitesimally close to a 
real number. The equivalence classes of ~0 are called monads. 
The monad of 0* consists of 0* and the infinitesimals. In the 
monad of a finite number r* there is exactly one real number, 
called the standard of r*. The notion of "standard" corresponds 
to the notion of limit in ordinary calculus, and one can prove 
analogous theorems. 
With the notion of "standard" such fundamental concepts as 
differentiability, differential quotient, continuity, Riemannian 
integral, etc., are definable. The well-known theorems arising 
from these notions are provable in Nonstandard Analysis. The con- 
struction of a nonstandard field ~* out of the field of the real 
numbers ~, as sketched above, is suitable for generalization: 
proceeding from a structure S, a sequence of structures (Sn)n~ 
can be constructed the union of which is called the standard 
universe S~(S~ = nk2e~Sn ) . In a quite similar way one can define 
recursively a nonstandard universe (So)* which corresponds to Se 
like ~* to ~ [Davis 1977]. This enlargement from "standard" to 
"nonstandard" -- "real" to "hyperreal," "standard" to "nonstandard" 
universe -- is reflected in the extension of set theory by adding 
new language particles (called e*, "standard," "internal") and 
new axioms to ZF[AC] involving these new language particles [e.g., 
Nelson 1977], but it does not fit in with the intentions of this 
note to go into further detail. 
Having sketched how Leibniz' idea of infinitesimals may be 
justified within the context of Nonstandard Analysis by means of 
model theory as developed by Robinson [1974], let us discuss the 
question of Godel's -- at least indirect -- contribution to this 
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subject. If one examines the formal proofs for the theorems 
indicated above which form the basis of Nonstandard Analysis, 
one sees that the axiom of choice is used in at least two places. 
For example, using Zorn's lemma which, as is well known, is equiv- 
alent to the axiom of choice, the ultrafilter theorem (i.e., the 
theorem on the extensibil ity of proper filters to ultrafilters in 
every Boolean power set algebra) is proved; BPUFE is equivalent to 
BUFE (i.e., the theorem on the extensibil ity of proper filters to 
ultrafi lters in every Boolean algebra). (For details see Jech 
[1973, 15-17].) BUFE is equivalent with the Boolean Prime Ideal 
Theorem BPI (the theorem that every Boolean algebra has a prime 
ideal); BPI is equivalent with RPIE (the theorem on the exten- 
sibility of proper ideals to prime ideals in a commutative ring 
with unit element)[see Banaschewski 1983]. RPIE is equivalent 
with RPI (the theorem that every commutative ring with unit ele- 
ment has a prime ideal; likewise RMIE (the theorem on the exten- 
sibility of proper ideals to maximal ideals in a commutative ring 
with unit element) is equivalent with RMI (the theorem that every 
commutative ring with unit element has a maximal ideal): if R is 
a co~utat ive  ring with unit element and J is a proper ideal on 
R, then the quotient structure R/J is likewise a commutative ring 
with unit element, for the zero element in R/J holds [0] = J ;  
presupposing RPI,R/J has a prime ideal K. Wi th J * :  = {xeR I [x]eK}, 
it holds J / J  = {[0]} ~ K = ~* /~ and with xeJ, [x]£ ~/ J  ~ K, x£J*. 
Thus ~ *  andS*  is a proper prime ideal; therefore RPI implies 
RPIE; the reverse implications hold trivially. The same is true 
when "maximal" is substituted for "prime": RMI is equivalent to 
RMIE. RMIE is equivalent with the axiom of choice AC [see Hodges 
1979, 285]. According to the fact that in every commutative ring 
with unit element every maximal ideal is a prime ideal, RPIE is 
implied by RMIE, but RPIE does not imply RMIE: if RPIE -- being 
equivalent with BPI -- would imply RMIE -- being equivalent with 
AC --, then BPI would imply AC; but BPI does not imply the axiom 
of choice AC [Halpern and Levy 1971]; therefore RPIE does not imply 
RMIE; so the problem raised by Dana Scott [1954, 390] whether 
RPIE is equivalent with MPIE must be answered negatively. However, 
the other problem posed by Dana Scott, whether or not RMIE is 
equivalent with AC, has been answered positively [Hodges 1979]. 
The ultrafilter theorem BPUFE, as we have already stated, is 
used to develop the foundations of Nonstandard Analysis, and is 
not provable in either the NBG or ZF system without the axiom of 
choice. If the axiom of choice were used only at this point in 
establishing Nonstandard Analysis, then the latter could be estab- 
lished in NBG[BPI] or ZF[BPI]. But it can be shown that the axiom 
of choice is also used in proving the ultraproduct theorem of ZoO. 
(For certain generalizations, the axiom of choice is also required.) 
In fact, as is well known, the theorem of ~o~ together with BPI is 
equivalent to the axiom of choice [Howard 1975, 426-428]. But 
neither BPI -- as stated already -- [Halpern andLevy ,  1971], nor 
the theorem of ~o~, by themselves, imply the axiom of choice [see 
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Blass, 1977, 329-331]. Therefore, BPI does not imply {o~' theorem, 
nor does ~o~' theorem imply BPI. Indeed, in the present founda- 
tions of Nonstandard Analysis, the axiom of choice cannot be 
dispensed with. 
But on the basis of Godel's result that the consistency of 
Neumann-Bernays-Godel set theory (NBG) is equivalent to the con- 
sistency of NBG plus the axiom of choice -- which, incidentally, 
implies at once that NBG is consistent if and only if NBG plus 
the prime ideal axiom BPI is consistent -- the use of the axiom 
of choice is no disadvantage (in contrast to the pre-Godel era!), 
and alternative theories which may be developed without that axiom 
have no claim to preference by this fact alone. 
Thus Godel's result represents an important contribution to 
Nonstandard Analysis. Moreover, because the ultrafi lter theorem 
is equivalent to Godel's theorem on the completeness of first- 
order logic [see Henkin 1954], his result, seen from the viewpoint 
of Nonstandard Analysis, appears in a new light. Godel has, 
therefore, made an important contribution toward the justification 
of Leibniz' idea of infinitesimals. 
REFERENCES 
Banaschewski, B. 1983. Journal of the London Mathematical Soc- 
iety 27, 193-202. 
Blass, A. 1977. A model without ultrafilters. Bullet~n de la 
P • Academle Polonaise de Science, S~rie Mathematlque" " , 25, 329- 
331. 
Christian, C. C. 1983. Der Beitrag Godels fur die Rechtfertigung 
der Leibniz'schen Idee von den Infinitesimalien. Sitzungs- 
berichte der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
mathem.-naturw. Klasse 191. 
Davis, M. 1977. Applied Nonstandard Analysis. New York: Wiley. 
Godel, K. 1966. The consistency of the continuum hypothesis. 
Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
Univ. Press. 
Halpern, J. D., and Levy, A. 1971. Proceedings of symposia in 
pure mathematics, Vol. XIII, Part i, Providence, R.I.: Amer. 
Math. Soc. 
Henkin, L. 1954. Metamathematical theorems equivalent to the 
prime ideal theorems for Boolean algebras: Preliminary report. 
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60, 388. 
Hlawka, E. 1968. Leibniz als Mathematiker. Philosophia Natur- 
alis I0, 146-168. 
Hodges, W. 1979. Krull implies Zorn. Journal of the London 
Mathematical Society (2) 19, 285-287. 
Jech, Th. 1973. The axiom of choice, pp. 15-17. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland. 
Laugwitz, D. 1978. Infinitesimalkalkul. Mannheim/Wien/Zurich: 
Bibliographisches Institut. 
HM ii Note 219 
Luxemburg, W. A. J., and Stroyan, K. 1976. Introduction to the 
theory of infinitesimals. New York: Academic Press. 
Meisters, G. H., and Monk, J. D. 1973. Construction of the 
reals Via ultrapowers. Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathe- 
matics 3, 141-158. 
Nelson, E. 1977. Internal set theory: a new approach to non- 
standard analysis. Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
society 83, 1165-1198. 
Richter, M. M. 1972. Nonstandard Analysis and general compac- 
tifieation. Habilitationsschrift, T~bingen 1972. 
Robinson, A. 1974. Nonstandard Analysis, 2nd ed. New York: 
American Elsevier. 
Schmieden, C. and Laugwitz, D. 1958. Eine Erweiterung der In- 
finitesimalrechnung. Mathematische Zeitschrift 69, 1-39. 
Scott, D. 1954. Prime ideal theorems for rings, lattices, and 
Boolean algebras: Preliminary report. Bulletin of the 
American Mathematical Society 60, 390. 
